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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
PHILLIP LAROCCO, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No, 860172-CA 
Priority No. 2 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was Mr. Larocco denied his right to a fair trial and 
equal protection of the law when jurors saw him shackled and in 
police custody during the trial? 
2. Did the State fail to rebut the presumption of 
prejudice raised by the unauthorized contact between jurors and a 
prosecution witness? 
3. Did the warrantless search of Mr. Larocco's automobile 
violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I §14 of the Utah Constitution? 
4. Was Mr. Larocco improperly convicted of both Theft and 
Possession of Stolen Property? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a Petition for Rehearing of a decision filed by 
this court on August 27, 1987. Originally this case was appealed 
from convictions for Theft, a Second Degree Felony and Possession of 
a Stolen Vehicle, a Third Degree Felony, in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant agrees with the facts set forth in the 
Court's opinion. However, further facts involved in this case and 
recited in Appellant's Brief at 5-6 indicate that two members of the 
jury witnessed incidents clearly indicating that Mr. Larocco was in 
custody. In addition, the record indicates that a second juror 
overheard the conversation between the witness and the other juror. 
The second juror was not questioned by the court in an attempt to 
overcome the presumption of prejudice raised by the contact. See 
Appellant's Brief at 11-12, Appellant's Reply Brief at 1-2. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because the Court failed to address Appellant's argument 
that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial and 
equal protection of the law were violated when two jurors saw him 
shackled and in police custody, this petition for rehearing should 
be granted. 
In addition, because the State failed to sustain its burden 
of proof under State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1986) that the two 
jurors who had contact with a witness were not tainted thereby, this 
petition should be granted. 
Further, because the facts of this case differ markedly 
from those in New York v. Class, 106 S.Ct. 960 (1986) in that 
officers actually saw a vehicle identification number on the 
dashboard in this case and therefore had no reason to proceed 
further in searching for a VIN, this Petition should be granted. 
Finally, since the crime of Theft requires an intent to 
permanently deprive an individual of goods, a defendant cannot be 
convicted of both theft and possession of the same stolen item, and 
this Petition should be granted to review that issue. 
INTRODUCTION 
This petition for rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35, 
Utah Rules of Court of Appeals. In Brown v. Pickard, denying reh'g, 
11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established the 
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court failed 
to consider some material point in the case, or 
that it erred in its conclusions. . . . 
11 P. at 512. Later, in Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1913) this 
Court added: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions for 
rehearings in proper cases. When this court, 
however, has considered and decided all of the 
material questions involved in a case, a 
rehearing should not be applied for, unless we 
have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or 
decision which may affect the result, or that we 
have based the decision on some wrong principle 
of law, or have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the 
result. . . . If there are some reasons, 
however, such as we have indicated above, or 
other good reasons, a petition for a rehearing 
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should be promptly filed and, if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
Cummings v. Nielson, supra at 624. The argument section of this 
brief will establish that, applying these standards, this petition 
for rehearing is properly before the Court and should be granted. 
In its opinion in State v. Larocco, Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 
860172-CA (filed August 27, 1987) (attached as Addendum A) this 
Court did not address an issue raised by Appellant and overlooked 
applicable law and otherwise misapprehended or misconstrued the 
facts and law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MR. LAROCCO WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL 
AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW WHEN JURORS SAW 
HIM SHACKLED AND IN POLICE CUSTODY DURING TRIAL. 
In his opening brief, Mr. Larocco contended that he was 
denied his right to a fair trial and equal protection of the laws 
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution when jurors saw him shackled and in police custody 
during the trial. (Appellants Brief at 29-33). Mr. Larocco 
continues to maintain this position. Since this Court failed to 
address the issue raised by Appellant in its opening brief, Mr. 
Larocco respectfully requests that this Petition be granted and that 
this Court address the issue. 
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POINT II 
THE STATE FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THAT 
AROSE FROM THE UNAUTHORIZED CONTACT BETWEEN JURORS 
AND A WITNESS. 
'; in' i .) I i •! I II i'"' I  II' i- I I1 ,•,:," i iin il ii 11 ! II11 / 1 I I ii | |")inion in t™ h P p r e s e n t 
case, the Utah Supreme Court has taken fa t;ti ict approach in 
assuring that Hie constitutional guarantee of a fair trial not be 
I ' l H I l p ] M i l l I S H M i j | t ; , M l l p r <Ui'|'i''tJI'II! 'I'" M l , . | i ' 1 ,',.! Il P | i h i - ' l l I'llMir If,""' . i l I  I1 I V I I n P S 5 i P i r : " ! 
S t a t e v , P i k e , 7 1 2 P . 2 d 2 7 7 (i,i t a h 1 9H'•! 'I . 
W h e r e m o r e Mian i n c i d e n t a l c o n f a c t - b e t w e e n a J I I I O I HIMI 
w ] (,., n t? !J L> uI,;(; u i. b
 { I I (»'I m | !„ ,.i | » J ••• j,»r t»" s i j in [» I i ,i 11 i I | • ir e ') u d i c" f? a t i $ e . s , „i::l P P 
S t a t e v . P i k e / s u p r a . 
As t he d i s s e n t p o i n t e d onf; ( ' ! " n n,1»-»r P i k e a m e r e d e n i a l o f 
p r e j u d i c e by t h e jtJt:oi:/ LM i , n a u t l i* l e n t I i n b u l I h. j.u esuni |,.-1\ i n , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y w h e n , a s h e r e , H i e j u r o r h a s d i f f i c u l t y a d m i t t i n g t h e 
(,iix f i>11! II•»I" i!11" i <""onve r /?\a t i o11" I < I a t 1 8 ; 12) Ml I•, Ha i 1 e s was n o t .^  
m i n o r w i t n e s s , s i n c e h i s t e s t i m o n y was c n t . i c a l '• " h e Si di *•* " < • i n e ? 
a n d (1) t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of p o l i c e o f f i c e r s , t h e t o p i c o f t h e 
II " i II \ r f»'" i n a l • I  i II in 11 I I in i ; •;, i ' -1; •„ I-'" i < i," • i II f - i II ' i it 1 l- ir J l 11 -j S t a t e ' s c a s e and the 
e f f e c t of such c o n v e r s a t i o n on I lie uiror was not a d e q u a t e l y 
r e b u t t e d , Td, a t IB fn a d d i t i o n , t h e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t a second 
I"iii'„ i wa.fi" p I1" "-1 j i i i ii " il I1"1"1/ l hi i HI vf'M'.s1,,) 1 n m wvt r, nnf, r e b u t t e d by t h e 
S t a t e . 
P u r s u a n t to Hie s t r i c t : s t a n d a r d s ser f o r t h in S t a t e v . 
Pji'lli'1 .MJ[i|ii, I In "II in I I I iiilVil I I I ;n I i i n ml Inn i"li • 11 (il ir IIMIHI I t i nn t h e 
p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t fh*14 two j u r o r s were p r e j u d i c e d by I he c o n v e r s a t i o n 
be tween one j u r o r and witness H a i l e s . An a i e s u l t j f t he S t a t e ' s 
failure to rebut the presumption of prejudice, Mr. Larocco 
respectfully requests that this Court grant this Petition. 
POINT III 
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MR. LAROCCO'S AUTOMOBILE 
VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Mr. Larocco agrees with the Court's ruling that he had 
standing to assert the issue of the legality of the search of his 
automobile. However, Mr. Larocco contends that the narrow holding 
in New York v. Class, U.S. , 89 L.Ed. 2d 81; 106 S.Ct. 960 (1986) 
is not controlling in this case. 
In New York v. Class, supra, Justice O'Connor specifically 
limited her holding to the circumstances of that case. In Class, 
officers attempted to ascertain a car's VIN after observing Mr. 
Class commit two traffic violations and exit his vehicle. The VIN 
on the dashboard of the automobile was obscured by papers; the 
officers reached inside the. vehicle to move papers so as to view the 
VIN and observed a gun. 
The Class court pointed out that federal regulation 
requires that the VIN for cars manufactured after 1969 must be 
visible through the windshield. See New York v. Class, supra; 49 
C.F.R. §571.115. In the present case, the automobile was 
manufactured in 1973 and had a VIN visible on the dash as required 
by federal regulation. Mr. Larocco was not in the vehicle nor was 
he stopped for traffic violations. After seeing the VIN on the dash 
as required by federal regulation, the officers chose to continue 
their search by opening the door of the vehicle. 
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d i s s e n t i i o t e s ,r t r. • •'" ; a s s •: ^ - r <? t a t e d : 
We n o t e t h a t our h o l d i n g today aues nut d u u i u u 
p o l i c e o f f i c e r s t o e n t e r a v e h i c l e t o o b t a i n a 
dashboa rd -moun ted VIN when the VIN \s v i s i b l e 
from o u t s i d e t h e a u t o m o b i l e . I f t h e VIN i s in 
t h e p l a i n view of someone o u t s i d e t h e v e h i c l e , 
t h e r e i s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n fo r gove rnmen ta l 
i n t r u s i o n I n t o t h e p a s s e n g e r c om pa r tin e n t t -• s ee 
i t . 
New York v . C l a s s , sup ra a t '•Mi,» (nmphas is a d d e d ) . 
In *:'::; it c a s e f whe: ^ r r ^ "fr*- - a s h was in p l a i n v iew, 
i r 1 I""i 1 » h°r 2 n s p e c t i o n . 
POINT" I V 
MR. LAROCCO WAS IMPROPERLY CONVICTED OF BOTH THEFT 
AND POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY, 
In -'>rder to be convicted of Theft of a Motor Vehicle, an " 
i n d i v 1 d u a I m 1 1 s t (1 } o b t a i n o 1: e x e r c i s e 1 1 n a u t h o r i z e d con 11: o I o v e r t h e 
t h e owner of p o s s e s s i o n . Every p e r p e t r a t o r • ::: f a til lef t h as 
p o s s e s s i o n o f s t o ] e n p r o pe r t] ; i 11 m e d i a t e ] y a f t e r t: h e c om p 1 e t i o n o f 
t h e t h e f t a 1 1 d w i 1 Il I: 1 a e p 0 s s e s s i c ! 1: :i <:: f 11: :i e p 1: • :: p e r t: y I: a k e 1: 1 i 11: :t J e s s a 1 1 < 3 
until the property is sold, given a'way • :: 1: • destroyed. 
I n i t: s o p i n :i o n , t: h i s C o \ :i r t f o c \ 1 s e d o n t h e f o u r \ r e a 1: p e 1: i o d 
since t h e t h e f t o f 11: :i e a u t on o b i ] e a 1: 1 d s • 1 : a t e d ' ' ( t ) II: 2 c r i in, e c: I: ! 1 e £ 1 
fay no means i n c ] udes r e t e n t i o n and p o s s e s s i o n of t h e s t o l e n goods 
f :: 1: a pe 1:i od of fou r y e a r s . 1 1 1 d• a t 1 3 . 0n t:he c o n t r a r 1 ir,- t h e c r ime 
of th ef t r eq u i r e s a n i n t e n t t o pe rm a n e n 11 y de p r i ; e u 1: 1 ii *1: 1:1 1 e 
Court:f s rationale, an :i ndi vidual need take no action after stealing 
c 1 1 :li 1 :: Eiiri it a 1 :t• :i t:ak:li 11: 1 g i I: 1 1 ::)i nie 1 : I: e 3 1 1 :ii 1 t ;; : f I: :: t:h t h e f t and o s s e s s i o n 
o f s t o 1 e n p r o p e 1: t: y , T1 1 e m e 1: e p a s s a g e c: f I i m i • 5 , w i 11: 1 o u t f u 1 h e r 
criminal activity 01 i the par t of the defendant, gi /es ri se to the 
additional charge of possession of stolen property. The Court's 
opinion fails to consider the required intent to permanently deprive 
in theft cases, and offers no guidance as to the period of time one 
may hold stolen property after a theft before he becomes guilty of 
possession of stolen property. According to this Court's opinion, 
four years after the theft, a charge of possession of stolen 
property exists; however, immediately after the theft, such a charge 
does not exist. Mr. Larocco respectfully contends that some further 
action by a defendant, and not the mere passage.of time, is 
necessary to give rise to the charge of possession of stolen 
property. 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Larocco respectfully requests 
that this petition for rehearing be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Larocco, by and through 
counsel, respectfully requests that this petition for rehearing be 
granted. 
Counsel for Mr. Larocco certifies that this petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. 
rt4-Respectfully submitted this ^  day of September, 1987. 
fhtiC] .&ird) 
LISA J.7REMAL 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
- 8 -
CERTIFICATION 
I, LISA J. REMAL, do hereby certify the following: 
(1) I am the attorney for appellant-petitioner in this 
case; 
(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court 
in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this Jo day of September, 1987. 
LISA J. RjjMAL 
Attorney for Appellant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this day of September, 1987. 
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